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BOOK REVIEWS
God's World, God's Body,by Grace Jantzen. Foreword by John Macquarie
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984). Pap. $10.95.
Reviewed by CHARLES TALIAFERRO, St. Olaf College.
In recent years philosophers have sought to retain a Christian metaphysics while
either dispensing with or radically revising important tenets of the classical
Christian conception of God. Immutability, metaphysical simplicity, eternity,
necessary existence, essential goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence have
been among the most popular Divine attributes targetted for critical review. In
God's World, God's Body Grace Jantzen argues for the bold thesis that a Christian
metaphysics need not claim that God is incorporeal. Criticism of the thesis that
God is incorporeal is not new to philosophical theology, but Jantzen's work is
a significant, new attempt to establish the compatibility of theism with the view
that there are no incorporeal, nonphysical persons. Although I believe her work
has serious shortcomings, it is provocative, historically informed, and written
in a lively, engaging style accessible to a nonphilosophical readership.
A main impetus for Jantzen's project is the development of a nonCartesian
theory of the person she describes as holistic and nonreductionist which can
serve as a model for understanding God's relation to the world. Jantzen contends
that as there are good reasons for rejecting a Cartesian dualist understanding of
the human person, there are good reasons for rejecting a cosmic dualism with
respect to God's relation to the world. Cartesian dualism is the thesis that persons
are nonphysical individual things in causal relation to physical objects. Cosmic
dualism is the thesis that God is a nonphysical individual person in causal relation
to all created physical and nonphysical objects. Although Jantzen provides an
overview of what she takes to be problematic about Cartesian dualism, she does
not claim to offer strong philosophical objections against it (p.9,1O, 115). The
philosophical problems with dualism that she notes are not original and I will
not asses them here.
Her alternative theory of the person is not spelled out very clearly. Although
she believes that a person is neither a nonphysical thing nor a whole consisting
of a nonphysical thing and a physical thing, she also holds that "it is a mistake
to say that a person is nothing but his or her body" (p.142). She writes that "a
person's thoughts are more than his or her brain processes, and human loves
and hatreds more than chemical balances" (p.12S). There are "aspects of personhood", including human consciousness, personality, and feelings, which "transcend the material world" (p.12S). Her understanding of the person seems to be
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akin to Strawson's, which takes the category of being a person as primitive,
neither physical nor mental. This understanding of personhood is suggested in
her defense of 'transcendence' both with respect to God and human persons
which "takes personhood as primary, and understands by personhood the
framework within which the physical and the nonphysical aspects of being human
can be placed" (p.128). But her final thesis about persons is puzzling. Persons
are not frameworks or primitive concepts. Persons are individual things and if
they are not nonphysical nor wholes made up of physical and nonphysical things,
then presumably persons are physical bodies. Perhaps her reluctance to
straightforwardly identify persons and physical objects is intended to avoid identifying psychological properties (like feeling pain, loving, hating) with physical
properties.
Jantzen's overall cosmic theology is likewise confusing. On the one hand she
rejects the notion that God is distinct from the physical world and writes that
"God and the universe are one reality, not two" (p.143); "God and the world
are a single reality" (p.156). But she also affirms that "God is not reducible to
the physical universe" (p.127). It is not clear why she avoids the straightforward
claim that God is identical with (or "reducible to") the physical universe. If God
exists and God is not nonphysical, it seems that God is physical. If God is not
identical with the physical universe, what is God identical with? It is hard to be
"more" than all that is physical without being nonphysical. I take her view to
be that God is the physical universe and her disclaimer of reductionism to amount
to the claim that God (the physical universe) has nonphysical properties like
being loving, being omniscient, being omnipotent, being able to respond to
prayers, and so on. Her rejection of reductionism may be a rejection of the view
that God's properties are merely a function of the various parts making up the
physical universe and hence God. ("It is false that a thing can be no more than
the sum of its parts" p.147). She does not want to "appeal to materialistic
mechanism in giving an account of the transcendence of God" (p.129). It is
unfortunate that Jantzen does not state her preferred ontology with greater clarity.
At times she simply discusses the limitations of certain descriptive terms. "Ultimate reality is not describable in solely mechanistic terms" (p.127) and she
denies that "God is finally describable in exclusively physical terms" (p.127).
For many modem writers, such facts about language may not have obvious
ontological implications.
A recurring problem with God's World, God's Body is the failure to properly
distinguish between the thesis that God is nonphysical and the view that God
has no body. Traditional theists hold that God is continuously causally involved
with the physical universe. God exercises omniscience with respect to the world;
He can exercise omnipotent power with respect to it; and the world exists in
virtue of God's causal, sustaining power. According to certain theories of what
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it is to be embodied, the world could properly be said to be God's body without
entailing that God is identical with the world or that God is a whole made up
of Spirit and world. Jantzen acknowledges that the God-World relationship could
be understood as a relationship of embodiment without implying God is not
distinct from the world (p.86, 87), but she seems to ignore this in her criticism
of "cosmic dualism." For example, she writes: "If he (God) is incorporeal, how
can he be near us when we pray? How can he be anywhere? If he has no body,
how can he act in response?" (pp. 73,74) And: "An incorporeal being, for instance,
would be limited to those sorts of activity which do not require a body for their
performance" (p.106). "Now, a disembodied being would not have a body to
move, and therefore could perform no basic actions" (p.85). At these points she
seems to disregard the distinction between the thesis that God is nonphysical
and the view that God has no body. Thus, she takes her arguments for understanding the world as God's body to also be arguments that God and the world
are a "single reality."
Jantzen's most interesting argument for her understanding of the God-World
relation is based upon appeal to divine omniscience. "Now, if theists wish to
say that God has direct and unmediated knowledge of the whole universe, which
typically they do, this seems to point precisely away from the doctrine of divine
incorporeality" (p. 81). She seems to argue as follows: God's omniscience with
respect to the world is direct and unmediated. An incorporeal being could not
have direct and unmediated knowledge of the world. Therefore God is not
incorporeal. She likens a corporeal God's epistemic access to the world to a
human's epistemic access to states of her body. "An ordinary human being has,
in addition to direct knowledge of his or her mental states, direct knowledge of
his or her body" (p. 81). Examples of the latter may be a subject's claim to
simply know where her hand is, or the location of her leg without having to
infer this from perceptual experience. Jantzen claims that the traditional theistic
view which construes God as incorporeal or as "disembodied" as she puts it,
cannot account for such immediate knowledge. "A disembodied spirit could have
direct knowledge only of his or her own thought and feelings; all knowledge of
the world external to him/herselfwould be mediated" (p. 80,81). There are several
problems with the argument.
First, it may be questioned whether we do in fact have direct knowledge of
our physiological, bodily states. Jantzen does not define what she means by
immediacy and directness, but if these terms are taken to imply the subject's
inability to be mistaken, then it is doubtful we have direct knowledge of our
bodily states. Certainly we can be mistaken with respect to identifying the location
of our limbs and other parts of our body (note reports of phantom limb experiences). Even if such a skeptical point does not defeat the claim to direct knowledge, it is still plausible to believe that knowledge of our bodily states is mediated
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by sensory experience, as in the case of somasthetic sensations. As noted above,
Jantzen seems to deny that psychological states or properties (she lists feelings
and consciousness among others) are identical with material states and properties.
If they are distinct, it would seem that my sensing my arm to have such and
such a location would be mediated by some somasthetic sensation or experience.
If this kind of mediation or indirectness is harmless, I do not know why a
nonphysical being could not have such direct knowledge of the world.
The motivation for claiming that God knows the world directly is not obvious.
The claim that God is omniscient is usually not analyzed in terms of how God
knows certain propositions, but as the claim that God knows all true propositions
(or some wide range of them). According to certain analyses of directness it
may be impossible for an omniscient being to have only direct knowledge.
Consider a subject to know something, P say, directly (or immediately), if the
subject knows P but does not know it in virtue of knowing Q, something other
than P. It would seem that if a being is omniscient she would know that she
knows certain things directly. But if she knows that, then that knowledge is had
in virtue of her knowing certain things directly. As Jantzen does not clarify her
notions of directness and immediacy, it is difficult to assess her position. It may
be observed, though, that if she concludes that the world is God's body in virtue
of the fact that God directly knows it, God's knowledge of mathematics and
abstract objects might warrant the claim that numbers, sets, and properties are
also parts of God.
Although Jantzen's treatment of God's epistemology is sketchy and incomplete,
she does raise several interesting issues. In discussing God's memory, she
suggests that God apprehends the past as a single specious present. The notion
of a specious present pertains to the ostensible experience of grasping at once
an event that encompasses an interval of time. Thus, listening to a tune or melody
seems to involve apprehending at once a process which takes place over a given
interval. Most defenders of the experience of the 'specious present' (Brentano,
Russell, James) grant that it can have varying lengths for different SUbjects. It
is interesting to speculate about the length of the 'specious present' for God, a
being of unsurpassable cognitive power. Jantzen maintains that even though God
is temporally extended and omniscient, he does not remember the past because
memory would involve an inadmissible indirectness in God's knowledge of the
world. Whether or not we want to deny memory qua indirect knowledge of God,
it is intriguing to speculate upon the nature and scope of divine knowledge.
Presumably, Jantzen's thesis entails denying that God recalls what the specious
present was like to him in 1980 as distinct from now, as well as denying that
the experience of the specious present involves what Russell called "fresh
memories".
Her discussion of whether God has sensations is also of interest (chapter 5).
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Unfortunately she does not take into account some of the important classic
treatments of God's knowledge of the world such as the Thomist thesis that God
knows the world in virtue of knowing his will. She also seems to reject speculations by some classic theists that God has sentient knowledge of the world
(perceptual experience of the world from all possible points of view and so on)
on the grounds that classic theism cannot account for how this is possible, God
not having any sensory organs. However Jantzen does not seem to be in any
better position to explain how God knows the world directly. She denies the
notion that the various objects in the world are God's sensory organs, the stars
being his eyes, black holes his brain(s), and so on (p. 69).
Part of God's World, God's Body consists in identifying and criticising obstacles to identifying the world and God which were influential in classic theism.
For example, God and the world are not distinct because (1) matter is subject
to change and God is not, for God is subject to change; (2) God is a perfect
being and matter is imperfect, for there is no reason to think of matter as
imperfect; (3) physical objects are temporally extented and God is not, for God
is temporally extended; (4) God is pure act, whereas matter is wholly potential,
for neither God nor matter are pure act or wholly potential; (5) God has no origin
whereas the corporeal universe does, for Christian theology can accomodate the
thesis that the corporeal universe has no origin. She claims it "would take us
too far afield" to consider the argument for the non identity of God and the world
in virtue of God's existing necessarily and the world not (p. 143,144). This is
odd because it is precisely such considerations that have exercised considerable
force for theistic natural theology from Samuel Clarke and Bishop Butler to
Richard Taylor.
In conclusion, consider two final puzzles. Jantzen wishes to avoid a view
which identifies the Christian God with a finite deity like Zeus. Moreover she
claims that "Nothing on earth is God or could be God" (p. 12). A serious problem
arises for Jantzen as she seems to accept the following two points. (1) The
universe, and thus God, can be finite. "If the universe is God's body, then, if
the universe is not spatially infinite, God is not spatially infinite ... "(p. 106).
(2) "God could change the shape and contents of the universe in any way he
chose" (p. 106) God "can, if he chooses, change his shape and size" (p. 107).
If '1' and '2' are correct, could not God eliminate all physical objects except
this piece of paper? If God did this and God is identical with the physical
universe, God would be identical with this piece of paper. Aside from the
absurdity of this notion, there is the general problem of how to understand God's
identity over time if he and the universe are "one reality" as Jantzen suggests
and yet God can radically alter all the contents of the universe. If God replaced
every object in the universe with distinct physical objects all at once, would God
still be the same being? Would this involve one God ceasing to be and another
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God coming into being or would there still be the same God notwithstanding a
replacement of all its parts? Jantzen may be able to satisfactorally address these
puzzles, but she does not do so in God's World, God's Body.

The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 1925-1929, by Lewis S. Ford.
Albany New York: State University of New York Press, 1984. Pp. xv and 351.
Paper $19.95, Cloth $39.50.
Reviewed by DONALD A. CROSBY, Colorado State University.
This is a serious book, of great importance and interest to persons interested in
understanding the development and content of Alfred North Whitehead's thought.
But I cannot help beginning this review on a note of delicious irony whose point
will not be lost on anyone who has puzzled over the text of Whitehead's major
philosophical treatise, Process and Reality, based on his Gifford Lectures in
1928 and first published in 1929. After finishing Science and the Modern World
in 1925, Whitehead declared in a letter dated May 16, 1926, that he wanted to
follow this work up "with something purely addressed to philosophers-short
and clear, if I can make it so!" (179). The resulting volume, none other than
Process and Reality itself, has many virtues, but brevity and ease of interpretation
are certainly not among them.
Lewis Ford offers us a method and theory of interpretation which goes a long
way toward explaining the notorious difficulty of the book, arguing that
Whitehead's thinking continued to be in a ferment of development throughout
its writing, and that many of its most distinctive features were introduced in
very late stages of that development. Some of these features were only vaguely
sketched or were not integrated with full consistency into what had already been
written, so there is an important sense in which Process and Reality was not so
much finished as abandoned, i.e., offered to the world in a volatile, still emerging
form. But Ford reasons that it could hardly have been otherwise, because the
onrush of Whitehead's creative intuitions and imaginative projections could not
be held in check. They continued to race ahead of his more settled ideas,
suggesting promising new lines of conceptualization which he did not entirely
succeed in assimilating or bringing to precise expression by the time the manuscript had to be turned over to the publisher.
Ford does not stop at trying to trace the development of Whitehead's thought
from the summer of 1927, when he produced the first draft of his Gifford
Lectures, to the time of the publication of Process and Reality. He goes back
further in time, to the period in which Whitehead was working on Science and

